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THE INTERDISCIPLINARY FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT THEORY
ALFRED C. YEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper scope of an author's property has long troubled
copyright analysts. Most agree that authors should (and do) own
the right to prevent others from literally duplicating original
copyrighted material. Beyond that, the reach of an author's
rights becomes very hazy. Can an author prevent the use of her
plot or characters? What about the general appearance of sculp-
ture, a painter's style or a photographer's perspective and choice
of subject matter? One hundred and fifty years ago all of these
items were part of the public domain.' Recent decisions, how-
ever, suggest that these items have now become private
property. 2
At first glance, extending authors' rights beyond literal re-
production seems like a good idea. As Judge Learned Hand
stated, "It is of course essential to any protection of literary
property ... that the right cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." 3 How-
ever, sober reflection indicates that too much of this good thing
is undesirable. Authorship is possible only when future authors
have the ability to borrow from those who have created before
them.4 If too much of each work is reserved as private property
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.S., M.S., 1980, Stan-
ford University; J.D., 1983, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Tracy
Tanaka, Boston College Law School class of 1991, for her able research assistance.
Some of the research reflected in this essay was supported by research grants from Bos-
ton College, Boston College Law School and the Boston College Law School Fellows.
I Early copyright decisions reflect a very narrow view of the kinds of appropriation
which constitute infringement. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853)
(No. 13,514) (refusing to find defendant's German translation an infringement of Har-
riet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin).
2 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (protecting "total concept and feel" of plaintiff's costumed charac-
ters and television series); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1936) (protecting plot of play); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 663 F. Supp.
706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (protecting plaintiff's perspective and style in illustration re-
ferred to as "a parochial New Yorker's view of the world"); Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris,
Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss copy-
right claim based in part on plaintiff's choice of camera angle, lighting, and subject
matter).
3 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
4 See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436):
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through copyright, future would-be authors will find it impossi-
ble to create. Society would presumably suffer from the de-
creased production of creative works. Proper construction of our
copyright law therefore depends on striking a socially acceptable
balance between the interests of authors and the public.
From a purely intuitive point of view, two issues certainly
seem relevant. First, society would like to ensure the promotion
of social welfare through the production of creative works. Sec-
ond, society would also want to strike a just and fair compromise
between authors and consumers of creative works. If we are to
believe various statements made by the Supreme Court, however,
the first issue is the only one which may be considered when in-
terpreting American copyright law. For example, in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios Inc., the Supreme Court wrote:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public ac-
cess to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired. 5
In my view, this one-sided approach to copyright cultivates
an obviously cramped view of an area which is assuming ever-
increasing importance for our society. After all, justice and fair-
ness are key considerations in most areas of the law, especially
property law.6 Why should copyright be any different?
This Essay will briefly, but critically, examine the major rea-
sons which have been given for why copyright should be different
from other areas of the law. Part II will begin by sketching two
copyright theories which follow the intuitions outlined above.
The first theory justifies copyright as an economic incentive
which advances social welfare. The second justifies copyright as
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily bor-
row, and use much which was well known and used before.... No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts
of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of
what other men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified,
exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.
5 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, reh'g denied,
465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
6 For an overview of various philosophies of property, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (1977).
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the legal vindication of a person's moral right to property in the
fruits of her labor. Part III will study the reasons for suppressing
the discussion of justice and fairness in copyright jurisprudence.
This Essay will show that these reasons are insufficient to support
the suppression, and goes on to outline arguments which demon-
strate that considerations ofjustice and fairness are essential to a
complete copyright theory. The Essay concludes with some re-
marks about the future of copyright theory.
II. Two MODELS OF COPYRIGHT
Modern American copyright scholars recognize two appar-
ently conflicting copyright theories. The first, and dominant,
theory states that copyright exists solely to provide necessary
economic incentives for the production of creative work. Under
this view, copyright is necessary because in its absence those in-
terested in using the author's work would simply copy the work
instead of buying it from the author. Authors would then find
their economic returns too small to justify the costs of author-
ship. In such a situation authors might not produce and social
welfare would presumably suffer.7 To remedy this problem, eco-
nomic theory supports granting authors copyright in their works.
However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope, because
copyright imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of
induced creative activity. First, the owner of copyright will
charge a monopoly price for her work. The number of people
who gain access to the work will therefore decrease.8 Second,
copyright raises the production cost of future works, because
prohibiting borrowing from existing works makes it more diffi-
cult for future authors to create. 9 Thus, the proper degree of
copyright protection is that which maximizes the difference be-
tween the benefits of induced creative activity and the costs of
increased authors' rights.'
The second, and generally less well explored "natural law
theory" considers copyright as the legal vindication of a person's
7 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989). In economic terms, an inefficiency, or "market fail-
ure," has occurred.
8 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1700-02 (1988).
9 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 332.
10 Fisher, supra note 8, at 1717. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 326. This
economic statement captures the conventional adage that copyright balances incentives
for production against the need for free access to works.
19921 425
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moral right to property in the fruits of her labor." Under this
theory, copyright's justification does not rest upon any showing
of economic necessity. Instead, copyright exists because soizi-
ety's failure to protect authors' property interests would result in
the denial of a basic human right. Thus, the author rightfully
gains copyright in her work to the extent that she can claim sole
credit for the work's creation.
A. The American Choice
Although both of the above described theories support
copyright's existence and suggest its boundaries, American ana-
lysts generally insist that copyright rests solely on economics.
Both the United States Supreme Court and Congress have stated
that copyright exists only for the purpose of advancing social
welfare through economic incentives for authorship.' 2  More-
over, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected natural law copy-
right arguments.' 3  Analysts generally follow this lead by
explaining copyright's basic doctrines such as originality and the
idea/expression dichotomy in economic terms.' 4 Two separate
lines of thinking support this choice.
I I This theory descends from eighteenth-century concepts of property. These con-
cepts are reflected in the writings of William Blackstone and John Locke. See 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8; JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT at § 27
(Peter Laslett ed., 1970) (3d ed. 1698).
12 See supra text accompanying note 5. See also H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, at S7
(1976).
The enactment of copyright legislation . . . is not based upon any natural
right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts
will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive
rights to their writings.
13 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-68 (1834).
14 These concepts are embodied in our present copyright code at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988). Together they define the existence and scope of copyright in a given work.
Originality provides the basic requirement for copyrightability by providing that only
"original works of authorship" are eligible for protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copy-
right therefore does not protect works which lack minimal creativity or are simply copies
of other preexisting works. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th
Cir. 1986) (denying protection to manufacturer's parts numbering system because of
lack of originality); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (holding that a
copy of preexisting work in public domain lacks sufficient originality), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976); Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (advertising phrases on envelope lack originality).
However, the mere fact that a work is "original" does not mean that copyright pro-
hibits all borrowing from that work. Instead, the idea/expression dichotomy permits
some borrowing from every copyrighted work by specifically excluding ideas from an
author's property. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, even though a book is protected by copy-
right, a future author is free to borrow the ideas embodied in the book. Only the book's
expression remains protected from copying. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game
Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.) (denying protection for instructions on how to play
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The first rests on the descriptive claim that Americans have
always viewed copyright as a matter of economics, and not a basic
matter of fairness and justice. Proponents of this argument base
their position on statements such as those noted in the preceding
paragraph. They also point out that the Constitution explicitly
contemplated an economic basis for copyright by authorizing
Congress to "promote the progress of... the useful arts."' 5 De-
parture from economic copyright theory therefore represents an
unwarranted, and perhaps unconstitutional, change from estab-
lished practice.
The second line of thinking rests on the normative claim that
natural law copyright theory leads to dire consequences. As an
initial matter, proponents of this view note that copyright lasts
for only a limited duration. 16 By contrast, natural law principles
would allow copyrights of unlimited duration. Furthermore,
copyright sometimes allows individuals to borrow original mate-
rial created by other authors. 17 They contend that a serious re-
Scrabble), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (idea of
a double-entry bookkeeping system not protected by copyright).
For example, since originality defines the works eligible for copyright protection,
its economic interpretation becomes an exercise in determining whether extending
copyright to a given work promotes social welfare. Similarly, application of the idea/
expression dichotomy becomes an economic cost-benefit calculation. If authors need
more incentive to produce creative works, then fewer facets of works should be consid-
ered ideas, and more facets should be considered expressions. If society needs greater
access to works, the converse is true. This vision suggests the use of economic analysis
to strike the required balance between the interests of authors and the interests of soci-
ety. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir.
1986).
[PIrecisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must
pay particular attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the dis-
tinction and copyright law generally. In this regard, we must remember that
the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to
promote learning, culture and development.
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
Major articles which adopt a primarily economic view of copyright include Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copy-
right, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); Landes & Posner, supra note 7; Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045
(1989). A recently published treatise by a leading copyright scholar, Professor Paul
Goldstein, also reflects the current primacy of economic theories of copyright. PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAw AND PRACTICE (1989). Although Professor
Goldstein does not exclusively use economic terms to explain copyright principles, they
certainly play a major role in many key areas of his work.
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
16 Copyright terms presently last for the life of the author plus fifty years. See 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1988). Additionally, the Constitution requires Congress to secure an au-
thor's copyright for only a limited period of time. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17 For a description of the so-called idea/expression dichotomy, see supra note 14.
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gime of property in the fruits of an author's labor would never
allow such a result. Thus, adherents to the second justification
state that recognition of copyright's natural law basis destroys
any balance between the interests of authors and the public.' 8
1. Evaluation of the Descriptive Claim
As noted previously, the descriptive claim for suppression of
copyright's natural law facets rests on constitutional language
and a long string of statements which purportedly restrict copy-
right analysis to economics. Closer examination of the record
shows, however, that the case for suppression is far from air
tight. If nothing else, early Americans did not view copyright as a
purely economic instrument. Instead, they referred explicitly to
copyright's support in both economics and natural law. For ex-
ample, no fewer than seven state copyright statutes contained
preambles such as New Hampshire's, which read:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization,
and the advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on
the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts
and sciences; as the principal encouragement such persons
can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature,
must consist in the legal security of the fruits of their study
and industry to themselves; and as such security is one of the
natural rights of all men, there being no property more pecu-
liarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labor of
his mind . . "
18 See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1185-87 (1983); Lyman Ray
Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 1161, 1210 (1975).
19 Act of Nov. 7, 1783, 1783 N.H. Laws 305. The copyright statutes of Massachusetts
and Rhode Island contained essentially identical preambles. See An Act for the Purpose
of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of Publishing their Literary Pro-
ductions, for Twenty-One Years, ch. 26, 1783 Mass. Acts 236; An Act for the Purpose of
Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of Publishing their Literary Produc-
tions, for Twenty-One Years, 1783 R.I. Acts & Resolves 6. Furthermore, the Connecti-
cut statute provided:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of natural Equity and Jus-
tice, that every Author should be secured in receiving the profits that may
arise from the Sale of his Works, and such Security may encourage Men of
Learning and Genius to publish their Writings which may do Honor to their
Country, and Service to Mankind ....
Act of Jan. 8, 1783, 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 617. The New York statute is substantially
identical. An Act to Promote Literature, ch. 54, 1786 N.Y. Laws 298. The NewJersey
statute contained the following preamble:
Whereas Learning tends to the Embellishment of Human Nature, the Honor
of the Nation, and the general Good of Mankind; and as it is perfectly agreea-
ble to the Principles of Equity, that Men of Learning who devote their Time
1992] COPYRIGHT THEORY 429
This thinking was echoed in Madison's support for the Fed-
eral Constitution's grant of congressional authority to enact
copyright legislation:
The utility of [the copyright power] will scarcely be ques-
tioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged
in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the in-
ventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals. 20
Evidence of copyright's non-economic heritage exists in
modern copyright as well. Despite ostensibly relying on a purely
economic outlook, the Supreme Court occasionally adopts state-
ments which reflect copyright's roots in fairness and justice.2 1
From statements like these we can conclude that natural law actu-
ally motivates courts, despite protestations to the contrary. Fur-
thermore, it has been suggested that modern copyright doctrine
is entirely consistent with a regime constructed from natural law
principles, and that economically interpreted concepts such as
the idea/expression dichotomy actually owe their ancestry to nat-
ural law.22 Finally, when one considers the existence of copyright
protection for works which do not require economic incentives
for production, 23 it is hard to believe that the repeated state-
and Talents to the preparing of Treatises for Publication should have the
profits that may arise from the Sale of their Works secured to them ....
An Act for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature, ch. 21, 1783 NJ. Laws 47.
Finally, the North Carolina statute provided:
Whereas nothing is more strictly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and
it is proper that men should be encouraged to pursue useful knowledge by
the hope of reward; and as the security of literary property must greatly tend
to extension of arts and commerce ....
Act of Dec. 29, 1785, ch. 26, 1785 N.C. Laws 22.
For a more complete analysis of evidence that early Americans viewed copyright as
a matter of natural law, see Gary Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's
Primacy in Copyright Law: FiveAccidents, 10 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 381,403-08 (1986).
20 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (E.M. Earle ed., 1976).
Madison's reference to common law copyright in Great Britain approvingly refers to the
famous case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769), which explicitly
recognized and enforced a natural law copyright claim. Although Millar v. Taylor was
overruled in 1774, Madison's reference still stands as an endorsement of its result and
reasoning. For a discussion of common law copyright, see LYMAN RAY PATrERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN PERSPECTIVE (1968); Abrams, supra note 18, at 1119.
21 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 ("Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve reward commensurate with the services rendered."), reh'g denied, 347
U.S. 949 (1954).
22 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 529-39 (1990).
23 For example, copyright protects theses papers written by graduate students in ful-
fillment of degree requirements. These works would be produced with or without copy-
right law. Thus, it is hard to see how copyright protection for such works increases the
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ments which restrict copyright theory to economics provide an
accurate description of actual copyright thinking. The claim that
courts and legislatures never associate natural law principles with
copyright is simply untrue. We should therefore criticize the ex-
tant purely economic copyright regime for its failure to recognize
copyright's roots in both economics and natural law.
2. Evaluation of the Normative Claim
The second reason for suppressing copyright's natural law
roots is the belief that consideration of natural law will destroy
any balance between the interests of authors and consumers.
This concern is certainly understandable. The idea that a person
should have a property interest in the fruits of her labor is power-
ful. Since a copyrighted work is surely the product of an au-
thor's labor, it would seem that all borrowing from a copyrighted
work violates the author's property in the fruits of her labor.
Copyright would therefore necessarily have to prohibit any unau-
thorized use of a copyrighted work. Future authors would find
no public domain from which to draw because everything (in-
cluding language) would owe its existence to other human
beings.
This fear is unjustified, for the notion that authors can claim
creative responsibility for (and therefore property in) an entire
work is simply false. Any frank appraisal of authorship must con-
clude that each author's work contains both the author's original
creations and material drawn from other authors24 and the soci-
ety in which the author lives.25 Authorship is therefore not the
creation of works which spring like Athena from the head of
Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion, and
transformation of input gained from the author's experience
within a broader society. This realization provides the factual ba-
sis from which the natural law theorist justifies a strong public
domain.
production of creative works. Their protection must therefore rest on something other
than economic theory.
24 See supra note 4; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1010-11
(1990). Brief consideration of one's own work should prove the essential truth of this
proposition. The honest legal scholar must admit that his arguments, conceptions,
methods of analysis, writing style, and terminology are heavily influenced, if not directly
formed, by the writings of others. Similarly, composers use sounds they have heard
before, writers recycle plots, and computer programmers use logic and techniques that
they have seen before.
25 A good example of this is our recognition of Mozart's music as both "Mozartean"
and German in its personality. Similarly, the work of Renoir and Monet can be identi-
fied both individually and as French.
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The easiest case occurs when authors borrow material from
society without restatement. In this situation, the natural law im-
plication is clear. Since the author did not create the borrowed
material, the author has no moral claim to property in it. Indeed,
granting an author property in the material by prohibiting its use
in future works would be unjust, for society would be deprived of
material that it had created. Thus, to the extent that borrowed
material already belongs to society, it should remain in the public
domain.
When material is borrowed and restated, the case for a pub-
lic domain is less clear, but equally sound. Consider a work in
which an innocent person is convicted of a crime and imprisoned.
Even if the work is fictional, it is not solely the product of the
author's labor. Rather, the work captures the products of society
(the plot) and the author (the rewriting of the plot). In effect,
society and the author are jointly responsible for the work's crea-
tion, and both should own some property rights in the work.
This implies putting part of the work into the public domain
while allowing the author property rights in other parts through
some sort of equitable division. 26 Thus, certain aspects of this
material become the author's property even though some public
property will be lost. More important, other aspects of the mate-
rial become public property even though the author will lose
property rights in some of her original creations. The point is
that society and authors must each get a fair share of works for
which they are jointly responsible.
Of course, the foregoing analysis leaves open the question of
how copyright should treat material which can be separately
identified as solely that of the author. A superficial natural law
analysis might conclude that copyright protects all of this mate-
rial. After all, if society did not create the material, it must have
been created by the author, and she should be able to claim her
property rights.
26 In other words, others have the right to copy some portions of the author's work.
In defining the scope of borrowing, courts must remain cognizant of the possibility that
the author's original material may be inseparable from public domain material. In these
cases, the so-called doctrine of merger should be applied so that the public domain is
not privately appropriated through copyright. The public domain is actually augmented
by denying property rights in original material. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that defendants did not copy
plaintiff's jeweled bee pin because it was not "an 'idea' that defendants were free to
copy"). Additional natural law support for this proposition comes from the famous
Lockean proviso. In that passage, Locke denies the existence of property in the fruits of
a person's labor where the appropriation fails to leave "enough and as good" for others.
LOCKE, supra note 1I.
1992]
432 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 10:423
A closer examination, however, shows that this position ac-
tually understates the extent of a natural law public domain,
which prefers including original creations rather than excluding
them.
If the public domain only contained material for which no
person could claim creative credit, authors would receive com-
pensation from all who borrowed their original material. Con-
currently, all authors who wanted to borrow from their
predecessors would have to pay for the privilege of doing so.
Although such a scheme seemingly gives each person the fruits of
her labor, it would in fact create an unjustified windfall to authors
fortunate enough to have already created copyrighted material.
If existing authors gained the power to prohibit all borrow-
ing from their works, they would reap huge benefits from subse-
quent authors who borrowed from them. At the same time,
however, they would probably never be forced to compensate
prior authors from whom they had borrowed. In some cases the
prior authors (and their heirs) may be dead. In other cases the
prior works may never have been copyrighted. Worse yet, in
some cases the prior authors might not be aware that borrowing
had even occurred. Thus, present day authors would gain the
fruits of their labors while never paying for their use of the labor
of others.
By contrast, a vigorous public domain that contains original
material avoids the problem of unjust enrichment. Since practi-
cally every author would both owe and be owed compensation
under a complete property rights scheme, it would seem emi-
nently fair to simply abandon the futile task of trying to reach a
perfect accounting of compensation among all authors. Instead,
society could "balance the books" in a more equitable manner
by forgiving many of the "debts" owed by modern authors to
their predecessors. In return for this windfall, modern authors
should forgive similar debts to future authors by dedicating some
of their material to the public domain. In other words, the public
domain would be used as a device through which authors could
both borrow from and compensate one another. The effect of
such a scheme would be to place even original material into a
public domain.27
27 The equitable contribution of authors to the public domain could be achieved in
two ways. First, portions of every work should be dedicated to the public domain imme-
diately upon creation. These portions should include those which are both likely to
have been borrowed (and therefore not original) and likely to be borrowed in the future.
A good example in modern copyright is the doctrine of scenes a faire, which places trite
19921 COPYRIGHT THEORY 433
III. THE NECESSARY CONSIDERATION OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
So far this Essay has shown that the primary reasons for sup-
pressing natural law theories of copyright are not compelling.
Indeed, it seems that the use of a natural law theory would be
consistent with present doctrine and would justify the existence
of a healthy public domain which complements the property
rights of authors. However, die-hard economic theorists will
surely not give up so easily. They may contend that economics
alone provides the best way to construct any system of rights,
including copyright.28 In my view, however, any attempt to con-
struct a copyright regime solely on economics is likely to fail.
The relevant problems can best be exposed by briefly setting
forth the premises on which an economic copyright regime
would stand.
As the reader is undoubtedly aware, a fundamental proposi-
tion of modern economics is that, under perfect conditions, the
unregulated self-interested transactions of individuals maximize
social welfare. 29 Of course, perfect conditions never exist. Gov-
ernment should therefore use the legal system to correct the mis-
allocation of resources caused by the lack of perfect conditions.
If one assumes that social welfare can be expressed in dollar
terms, we should then select the copyright regime which maxi-
mizes society's wealth, where wealth is defined as "the value in
plots, scenes, and sequences into the public domain. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Universal Pic-
tures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F.
Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Although these trite devices may sometimes be orig-
inal, the likelihood of their having been borrowed and their use by future authors makes
their immediate inclusion in the public domain fair. Second, all works should receive
copyright protection for a limited time only, thereby ensuring eventual dedication to the
public domain while providing a fair vindication of the author's creative labor. Such a
result presently exists under 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988), which terminates copyright fifty
years after the death of the author.
28 The pros and cons of such a proposition require a lengthy ethical and economic
discussion which space will not permit. Suffice it to say that such theorists have grown
numerous in recent years through the proliferation of the "Chicago School" of the law
and economics movement. It should also be stated that not all economic analysts agree
with the strong normative claims of the Chicago School. For defenses of an economics
only approach to all of law, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1989); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). For criticisms of these defenses, seejuLEs COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS AND THE LAW (1988); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 10
n.8 (1988):
The claim that law can be reduced to economics is similar to the claim that
used to be made in psychology that mind can be reduced to behavior. This
proposition, called "reductivism" in philosophy, is dead in psychology, and it
ought to be laid to rest in the economic analysis of law, too.
Id.; Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
219 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 28, at 44-49 (describing economic efficiency theorems
and defining conditions necessary for efficient operations of markets).
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dollars or dollar equivalents . . . of everything in society. It is
measured by what people are willing to pay for something or, if
they already own it, what they demand in money to give it up."3
In other words, government should correct misallocations of
property rights by 1) determining the price each person sets for
her property; and 2) reassigning each person's property to others
whenever the amount others are willing to pay for the property
exceeds the amount for which the individual is willing to sell that
property.
Although quite brief, the foregoing is sufficient to expose
two practical problems which make reliance on a purely eco-
nomic copyright model highly questionable. First, the necessity
of ascertaining prices means that courts require information they
simply do not have. This lack of information causes two related
problems for the economist. If economists do not have reliable
data on individual preferences, their calculations are necessarily
estimates. In an area such as copyright, the lack of information is
so severe that economic recommendations become little more
than random guesses about whether certain interpretations of
copyright actually stimulate creativity. 3' Moreover, even if infor-
mation related to copyright were available, the lack of informa-
tion for other sectors of the economy would mean that
recommendations that appear to increase welfare through copy-
right may in fact decrease social welfare overall.3
Even if these information problems could be overcome, sole
reliance on economics to assign copyright rights would remain a
highly dubious proposition, for economics is sometimes incapa-
ble of choosing among conflicting alternatives. For example, it is
30 Posner, supra note 28, at 119.
31 See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Com-
ment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHT 19, 21 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986).
The inability of economists to resolve the question of whether activity stimu-
lated by the patent system or other forms of protection of intellectual prop-
erty enhances or diminishes social welfare implies, unfortunately, that
economists can tell lawyers ultimately very little about how to enforce or in-
terpret the law of intellectual property.
32 See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 98-101 (1976) (describing the problem of
second best). This problem may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that
the available information suggests that an increase in copyright incentives would cause a
net increase in productive works of $100 million. At first blush, such a change seems
presumptively desirable. The net increase, however, occurs only by diverting capital
and human labor from other sectors of the economy to the production of copyrightable
works. The losses incurred in those other sectors must therefore be weighed against the
gains in the copyright area before one can consider the change wealth maximizing. The
difficulty of identifying all of the affected sectors and gathering the necessary informa-
tion makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the economist to make an une-
quivocal welfare maximizing recommendation.
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a well known fact that the price a person is willing to pay for a
resource depends on what the person already owns. If a person
owns very little, then she is unable to offer more than a small
amount for a resource no matter how badly she desires it. By
contrast, if she is wealthy, she is able to offer a lot.33 Further-
more, the price a person is willing to pay for an entitlement is
generally less than what she will sell the entitlement for once she
owns it.3 4 Since those who own entitlements such as copyrights
are likely to value them more than those who do not, the wealth
maximizer naturally prefers to assign rights according to the sta-
tus quo. This turns wealth maximization into a normative princi-
ple which justifies whatever assignment of property rights is
proposed. 5 The only way out of such a dilemma is to consider
other reasons (such as fairness and justice) for assigning property
rights to an individual.
V. THE INTERDISCIPLINARY FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT THEORY
American copyright theory should thus be expanded to in-
clude the natural law model which has long been suppressed.
This does not mean that we should discard the economic model.
Copyright obviously functions as an economic instrument in our
society, and we should continue to analyze it from that perspec-
tive. At the same time, however, we must realize that we cannot
find all the answers to copyright's riddles in the discipline of eco-
nomics. By restoring natural law thinking to copyright jurispru-
33 One might be tempted to consider how much those who are not wealthy would
pay for rights if they were. Economists ignore hypothetical preferences, however, based
on unowned wealth. As Judge Posner states, "[tihe only kind of preference that counts
in a system of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by money-in other
words, that is registered in a market." Posner, supra note 28, at 119.
34 MISHAN, supra note 32, at 133-134 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1129, 1151 (1986).
35 MISHAN, supra note 32, at 140-141, 398-401. A similar problem is raised by the so-
called Scitovsky Paradox. See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9
REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941). The problem noted in the text can be illustrated by the
following example. Consider proposal A. If proposal A is adopted, the producers of
records own the right to make cassette tapes from the records they produce. Producers
value this right at $200 because this is the additional revenue that they can gain by
making and selling cassette tapes to consumers. Suppose further that consumers would
be willing to buy the rights of making cassette tapes, but only if the price were $190 or
less. In this hypothesized situation, proposal A seems clearly wealth maximizing and
should be adopted. Since producers value the right more than consumers do, wealth is
maximized by assigning the right to producers.
For purposes of comparison, now consider proposal B, which is the opposite of
proposal A. Consumers now have the right to freely make cassette tapes from records.
Since they now own the right in question, consumers in situation B value the entitlement
more than they did in situation A. Suppose that they consequently will not part with the
right for anything less than $203. Under these facts, proposal B is preferable to propo-
sal A, and should be adopted.
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dence, we simply recognize that copyright exists not only to
promote social welfare, but also to secure to each person a basic
human right.3 6 Proper construction of our copyright law there-
fore depends on two separate inquiries. First, we must decide
just how much property we think authors deserve. Second, we
must decide how to structure the laws which secure those rights
to take advantage of our economic system's ability to stimulate
creative activity for our mutual benefit. The study of these ques-
tions forecasts a broad and interesting cross-disciplinary future
for copyright theory.
For example, the question of how much property authors de-
serve starts with an attempt to separate original material from
borrowed material in each work. Of course, the nature of author-
ship makes it likely that this attempt will only be partially success-
ful in giving authors and society their just desserts. Borrowed
material is often recast and reshaped to the extent that its identi-
fication or separation is impossible. Even seemingly original cre-
ations sometimes depend on borrowing which is not readily
apparent. When this happens, society must construct an equita-
ble division of property between the author and the public. Brief
reflection shows how the legal theorist's conception of this divi-
sion would benefit from cross-disciplinary inquiry. First, any sep-
aration of original material from borrowed material requires
sophisticated notions of creativity and borrowing. Second, if we
are serious about making an equitable division between authors
and society on the basis of the author's debt to her predecessors,
society's belief about the size of this debt becomes vitally impor-
tant. Art historians, literary critics and authors themselves will
undoubtedly have valuable insights to contribute to this debate.
Similarly, the question of how to structure legal entitlements
to take advantage of our economic system also requires compe-
tence in areas often outside a lawyer's training. Regardless of
how much property society thinks an author deserves, a wide
range of legal tools will become available to secure the necessary
rights. The obvious tool is the "breadth" of copyright's reach. If
authors deserve a lot, even very faint borrowings might become
actionable. However, other tools may secure for authors their
just desserts equally as well. Changing the length of copyright's
term, creating licensing schemes, or even making cash payments
36 This view is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
[III], U.N. Doc. A/810, at 76 (1948), which states, "[elveryone has the right to the pro-
tection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artis-
tic production of which he is the author."
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to authors would all affect the size of authorship's rewards. If
society wants to structure its. copyright rewards to take advantage
of our capitalist system, economists will undoubtedly have help-
ful recommendations for choosing among the various alterna-
tives. Since capitalism in turn depends on the cooperative
behavior of individuals, psychologists may be able to suggest
legal arrangements which facilitate bargaining. 7
Without question, the fi ture sketched out above will be diffi-
cult to explore. Few persons can claim expertise in all the disci-
plines relevant to copyright's construction. This problem may
deter some from changing the monolithic economic inquiry
which presently dominates copyright jurisprudence. Perhaps too
many cooks will ultimately spoil copyright's broth. Although
such a fear is perfectly understandable, I believe that we should
nevertheless expand our copyright discourse. Copyright law
gives individuals the power to control the future use of texts,
paintings, compositions, and other forms of communication. It
therefore fundamentally affects the kind of intellectual life each
of us is able to lead. Everyone, regardless of perspective, should
therefore be encouraged to participate in the ordering of that
life.
37 For example, economists often suggest that property rights exist for the purpose
of facilitating the private bargaining which promotes social welfare. Since empirical re-
search shows that bargaining is more likely to occur when the parties' rights are clear, it
seems that a judge or legislature interested in using copyright to advance social welfare
would select the least ambiguous rules possible. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 28, at
99-100. This insight is noteworthy because the present trend permits plaintiffs to claim
copyright in increasingly vague facets of their works. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 1659
(criticizing fair use doctrine as vague and uncertain); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel,"
38 EMORY L. J. 393 (1989) (criticizing modern interpretation of the idea/expression di-
chotomy as vague). To the extent that these decisions are justified as welfare maximiz-
ing economic incentives for authors, the potential welfare benefits may be offset by the
difficulty authors and potential consumers will face in bargaining over exploitation of
these vague rights.
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